Goals and Constraints of the Federal Reserve System: A Study of Its \u27Profits\u27 Policy by Marlow, Michael L.
GOALS AND CONSTRAINTS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
 
A STUDY OF ITS 'PROFITS' POLICY
 
Michael L. Marlow
 
Department of Economics
 
california Polytechnic state University
 
San Luis Obispo, CA 93407
 
ABSTRACT
 
This paper models the Federal Reserve's pursuit of 
goals within the constraining forces of Congress, the 
President, financial firms and the public. Two hypotheses 
are empirically examined. Hypothesis 1 is that the 
federal bUdget deficit is a determinant of Federal 
Reserve "profits," or U. S . Treasury deposits from the 
Federal Reserve. Hypothesis 2 is that government spending 
is significantly influenced by u. S. Treasury deposits 
from the Federal Reserve. Empirical support of these 
hypotheses suggests that the Federal Reserve is partially 
responsible for changes in the federal bUdget deficit and 
government spending. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Public Interest view argues that Federal Reserve 
policy is solely directed toward achieving economic 
stability. Policymakers are modeled as passive agents of 
society whose only dilemma is how to utilize the 
prescriptions of competing economic theories. Policy 
debates, for example, center on such issues as whe~her 
policymakers should favor discretion or rules of behavior 
in their money supply policies. This view has come under 
examination as economists have elevated bureaucratic 
incentives to appropriate sUbjects of inquiry. Partly due 
to the poor predictive ability of the Public Interest 
view, the Public Choice view has increasingly been used 
to study government bureaus like the Federal Reserve. 
Policy attributes of the Federal Reserve which do not 
appear consistent with the Public Interest view include 
its secrecy, large employment, churning of its open 
market portfolio and its inflationary bias. 
Public Choice views policy behavior as a function of 
goals and the incentives, or constraints, for meeting 
those goals and is analogous to modeling consumer 
behavior as sUbject to constraints. Modeling Federal 
Reserve behavior is difficult since, as Buchanan (1989) 
argues, its only mandated goal is the responsibility to 
"do good." Lack of specific mandates makes it difficult 
to jUdge performance of the Federal Reserve and its 
creator, Congress. Modeling is further complicated by a 
complex network of constraints that include at least four 
actors: the Congress, the President, the pUblic and 
private banks. 1 
This paper hypothesizes that Federal Reserve 
payments to the U.S. Treasury, or "profits," are one of 
the policy goals of the Federal Reserve. "Profits" are 
the residual between its expenses and income and are 
taxed at the rate of 100 percent. Even though the Federal 
Reserve does not receive a bUdget appropriation from 
Congress, this does not necessarily imply that its policy 
is totally self-determined. Because "profits" generally 
benefit politicians by reducing, dollar-far-dollar, 
bUdget def icits, Federal Reserve policy may be partly 
influenced by the desires of politicians. Two hypotheses 
are examined. One, are "profits" influenced by the 
financing needs of political sponsors? While textbooks 
typically argue the case of political independence, this 
view overlooks that the Federal Reserve is a creation of 
politics (Congress) and its major players are nominated 
by the President and approved by the Senate. TWo, because 
the financing method that Congress imposes on the Federal 
Reserve constitutes a 100 percent tax on "profits," do 
increases in "profits" (taxes) lead to higher government 
spending? Consistent with the views that hidden taxes are 
preferred by politicians and that taxes cause spending, 
"profits" are hypothesized to be a significant 
determinant of federal spending. Confirmed hypotheses 
would suggest that Federal Reserve policy is not only 
dependent on politics, but sponsor-interest in high 
"profits" may explain political reluctance toward 
heightened monitoring of its overall performance. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section 
surveys the literature with emphasis on the goals, 
incentives and constraints on the Federal Reserve. After 
discussing the goals and incentives associated with 
"profits," the two hypotheses are empirically examined. 
Summary and policy conclusions close the paper. 
CONSTRAINTS AND GOALS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
Goals 
The Federal Reserve is a bureaucracy since it 
regulates financial firms and the money supply within 
existing laws. It is subject to mandated and personal 
goals. Personal, or Niskanen's (1971) bureaucratic, goals 
include salary, amenities, reputation, secrecy, power, 
etc., and any satisfaction over improving economic 
stability. Mandated goals are imposed by sponsors and 
include price level stability, low interest rates and 
unemployment and come under the requirement "to do good." 
Lack of mandated policy rules means that discretion is 
used to promote "good" policy and allows, according to 
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), it to respond to changes in 
mandated goal priorities. 
Congressional Constraints 
Since 1947, the Federal Reserve has voluntarily 
transferred its excess earnings, or "profits," to the 
U.S. Treasury where they, dollar-far-dollar, reduce the 
federal bUdget deficit. 2 It is often argued that the 
reason why Congress placed the Federal Reserve outside of 
its appropriations process is motivated by its desire to 
make it independent of politics. However, there is no 
requirement that it transfer "profits" to the U.S. 
Treasury and, as Toma (1982) argues, previous episodes of 
rising "profits" sparked congressional interest which the 
Federal Reserve feared might be expressed in legislative 
measures, such as mandating their particular disposition. 
Partially in response to these fears, "profits" are 
voluntarily transferred to the U.S. Treasury where they 
are recorded as "miscellaneous receipts" in the revenue 
side of the federal bUdget where they are no different 
than any other tax and may be used to finance spending, 
or reduce operating deficits. "profits", for FY 1989, 
amounted to $19.6 billion, an amount approximately equal 
to custom duties. 3 
Another motivation for bUdgetary autonomy may be 
suggested by the observation that these "profits" 
represent sizable offsets to the federal bUdget deficit 
and therefore there may exist sizeable political gains 
from bUdgetary independence. This view suggests that 
political constraints on Federal Reserve behavior may 
influence "profits" pOlicy and is consistent with 
Buchanan and Wagner's (1977) argument that the Federal 
Reserve responds to the financing needs of the federal 
government. The churning of its Treasury portfolio is one 
means by which it may enhance "profits." For example, the 
Federal Reserve I s open market desk conducted gross market 
purchases of $1,396,877 million in 1989; however, the net 
change in the open market account was $16,070 million. 
The difference between the two numbers is one measure of 
churning. 4 By taking capital gains on its extensive 
portfolio, it affects "profits" and, in addition to 
Friedman's (1982) argument that churning may be related 
to promoting a sense of importance to its staff, 
enhancing the incomes of ex-officials (bond traders and 
chief private economists who "read the tea leaves" behind 
FOMe pOlicy) and "muddying ll the waters, churning may 
reflect a desire to affect U.S. budgetary affairs. This 
may not be surprising since, and as Auerbach (1990) 
discusses, bUdgetary affairs are a perpetual theme in the 
speeches and testimonies of Federal Reserve officials. 
This discussion does not argue that the Federal 
Reserve maximizes "profits." Rather, because it desires 
to consume bureaucratic goals, it may appease its 
sponsors' desires in those areas that it has some control 
over (e.g., inflation, interest rates, budget deficits). 
In other words, "profit" policy may affect the Federal 
Reserve 's ability to consume personal bureaucratic goals. 
Incentives or constraints for lower deficits may be 
conveyed as, for example, in return for larger "profits, II 
sponsors agree to lower monitoring of the Federal 
Reserve's attainment of bureaucratic goals. Therefore, 
portfolio churning may reflect desires to affect 
budgetary affairs as well as the promotion of broad 
mandated goals related to economic stability. 
other related arguments have been forwarded. 
Buchanan and Wagner (1977) argue that is unlikely that 
central bankers will pursue policy that is in sharp 
contrast to the people who nominated them. They predict 
that growing external demands for accommodation of 
growing budget deficits will result in an inflationary 
policy bias. s Toma (1982) presents evidence in support of 
the hypothesis that, because "profits ll supplement the 
government's general fund, it reduces the costs of 
fund-raising and therefore should expand public spending. 
His evidence suggests that the Federal Reserve conducts 
open market operations with an awareness of their wealth 
transfer effect and that it personally benefits, via 
higher spending, from inflationary monetary policy. 
While Congress created the Federal Reserve in 1913 
and it can change its goals and constraints, past changes 
have generally been in the direction of greater powers 
and broader general responsibilities. For example, in 
response to the Great Depression, Congress endowed the 
Federal Reserve with more authority and power. 6 The 
Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 increased the power and 
autonomy of the Board relative to the Regional Banks and 
the Treasury. The Acts also removed the Treasury 
Secretary and the comptroller of the Currency from the 
Board, increased the size of the Board, and lengthened 
the terms of office of the Governors. The Board was also 
given the authority to approve the chief operating 
officers of each Regional Bank and, in its creation of 
the FOMC, the Banking Act of 1935 achieved centralization 
of open market operations. 
Evidence indicates that congressional changes have 
resulted in greater power-centralization at the Federal 
Reserve.? The 1935 Banking Act centralized the power of 
the FOMC with the Board in Washington, D.C. and 
repositioned power away from Regional Banks to the 
Board. 8 Growing centralization is consistent with studies 
demonstrating that the Federal Reserve acts like a 
monopoly. For example, Toma (1988) argues that reserve 
requirements are "taxes" and a guarantee that banks 
demand Federal Reserve output of base money. Toma 
hypothesizes that when, prior to 1980, banks could choose 
their regulator (state or federal), the Federal Reserve 
would not choose monopolistic levels of reserve 
requirements. Toma argues that when the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (MCA) 
of 1980 granted the Federal Reserve a monopoly in reserve 
requirements, reserve requirements rose. Moreover, 
because the MCA was passed, in part, in reaction to 
declining Federal Reserve membership, the MeA enhanced 
9its monopoly powers. 
Increased centralization as a predictor of monopoly 
policy is also consistent with the "expense preference" 
theory of Edwards (1977). Expense preference theory 
argues that, when firms (bureaus) are not closely 
monitored by their owners (sponsors), they will incur 
expenses beyond profit-maximiz ing levels. This hypothesis 
has been applied to bureaus like the Federal Reserve 
because, since it can not retain dollar profits, it 
consumes more bureaucratic goods such as salary, trips, 
secrecy, etc. Finding a positive and significant relation 
between the monetary base and Federal Reserve employment, 
shughart and Tollison (1983) argue that base growth is 
motivated, in part, by a desire to expand its 
bureaucracy.lO Boyd (1984), strong (1984) and Allen et al 
(1988) provide contrary evidence to this hypothesis while 
Boyes (1988) and Mounts and Sowell (1990) provide 
confirming evidence. 
Bureaucracy theory also predicts that bureaus have 
an incentive to hide information from sponsors. Toma and 
Toma (1985) argue that, by obscuring information, the 
Federal Reserve reduces sponsors' knowledge of 
alternatives to the current monetary order. without 
useful information on alternatives to the control of 
inflation and banking stability, secrecy increases the 
demand for the Federal Reserve and lowers the quality of 
political monitoring. It is hypothesized that internal 
research that positively favors alternative policy is 
viewed as unproductive since it lowers the demand for 
itself and may result in smaller bUdgets or increased 
scrutiny. Toma and Toma note that the Federal Reserve 
conducts pre-publication review of articles in its 
reviews. 11 They also demonstrate that the bUdgets of 2 
Regional Banks (st. Louis and Minneapolis) suffered 
budgetary discipline when they favorably reported about 
policies that the Federal Reserve was not currently 
pursuing .12 
Presidential Constraints 
The U.S. President nominates and appoints, sUbject 
to Senate confirmation, the Governors of the Federal 
Reserve Board. SUbject to Senate confirmation, the 
President also appoints the Chairman and Vice Chairman of 
the Board of Governors. These appointments are important 
since the Governors constitute a majority on the FOMC, 
approve discount rate changes and may alter reserve 
requirement ratios. 13 However, after their confirmation 
and because of staggered terms, the conventional 
textbook-view sees Presidential influence as relatively 
unimportant. However, many of the above arguments 
regarding Congressional influence may be relevant since 
"profit" policies may benefit the President in much the 
same way. 
Kane (1980) argues that Congress and the President 
benefit from the lack of mandated Federal Reserve goals 
since this arrangement allows powerful special interests 
to influence policy. Since powerful interest groups are 
often adversely affected by rising interest rates, this 
autonomy forces the Federal Reserve to be influenced by 
special interests (the constituents of politicians) who 
promote policies that lean against rising interest rates. 
Lack of clearly-written mandated goals also may allow 
pOliticians to claim the "high moral ground" when it 
comes to rating monetary policy since politicians may 
claim responsibility for "good" policy and blame the 
Federal Reserve for "bad" policy -- an arrangement where 
the Federal Reserve is a political scapegoat. 
Another literature argues that the President usually 
receives the monetary policy (money growth) of his 
choosing. Grier and Neiman (1987) argue that the 
influence of the budget deficit on money growth is 
related to the party affiliation of the incumbent 
President in that the non-structural budget deficit 
influences money growth only under Democratic 
presidential administrations. Kane (1980), Woolley 
(1984), Meiselman (1986) and Harvrilesky (1988) also 
argue that monetary pOlicy is affected by incumbent 
Presidents. 
Private Bank Constraints 
Wagner (1986) argues that Tullock I s (1967) 
rent-seeking hypothesis partially explains Federal 
Reserve pOlicy and predicts that cartel-like arrangements 
with banks will evolve over time. Rent-seeking predicts 
that it is in the banks I self-interests to engage in 
activities that transfer wealth to themselves through tax 
laws, subsidies and legislation and views the Federal 
Reserve as agent, or broker, for these services. skaggs 
and Wasserkrug (1983) argue that, in pursuit of autonomy, 
the Federal Reserve develops a constituency with banks as 
a means of protecting itself from congress. Shughart 
(1988) argues that similar arrangements explain the 
emergence of the Glass-Steagall Act. 14 
Anderson, Shughart and Tollison (1988) question the 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) theory that Federal Reserve 
behavior during the Great Depression was based on 
irrationality. They view the restrictive monetary policy 
of 1929-33 as rational, self-interested behavior that 
promoted a large differential failure rate between member 
and nonmember banks. Over 1930-33, the percentage of 
suspensions that were members averaged only 20% (or 40% 
of total deposits). These failures are argued to have 
served two purposes. For members, it enhanced their 
monopoly power and, for the Federal Reserve, it enhanced 
its control over the banking system. 15 
Havrilesky (1990) argues that, via the Federal 
Advisory Council, the banking industry influences Federal 
Reserve policy. 
Private Market Constraints 
The pUblic constrains the Federal Reserve through 
their ability to elect members of Congress and the 
President who, in turn, nominate and approve the 
Governors of the Federal Reserve. To the extent that 
voters are concerned about Federal Reserve policy, 
elected representatives may signal to the Federal Reserve 
the concerns of their constituents. For example, the 
Banking committees of the House and Senate may constitute 
one avenue whereby voters indirectly signal to the 
Federal Reserve. This method is long-run since it is a 
function of the terms of office of elected 
representatives and Federal Reserve officials and the 
degree of useful information at the pUblic's disposal. 
One pOlicy dilemma is that what the public monitors 
is different from what the Federal Reserve can directly 
control. The pUblic and pOliticians want "low" interest 
rates, "fast" economic growth and price stability. 
Acheson and Chant (1973) argue that several factors 
explain central bank goals: the degree goals are 
identified as goals of the central bank, the visibility 
of attainment and priorities of sponsors. Failure to meet 
visible goals increases the odds of examination, while 
failure to meet less visible goals does not. One policy 
dilemma is that the ability to achieve many of the 
visible goals rests with money growth -- a statistic not 
monitored as closely as interest rates or economic 
growth. scrutiny then is placed on variables that lie 
outside the direct control of the Federal Reserve and may 
force it to meet multiple goals that are many times 
incompatible in the short run and/or long run. 
Randomness, or unpredictability, in money growth may 
be one way the Federal Reserve meets conflicting goals 
over time. 16 Moreover, if the Federal Reserve follows a 
rational expectations view of the world, observed policy 
randomness, or policy secrecy, may suggest that Federal 
Reserve policy is aimed at stabilizing the economy. Such 
randomness is consistent with Goodfriend's (1986) 
reporting that, in the course of a Freedom of Information 
Act suit, the Federal Reserve argued that secrecy was an 
important tool of monetary policy. Finally, policy 
randomness may also be consistent with the attainment of 
bureaucratic goals since, to the extent it fosters low 
accountability, it may be consistent with Auerbach I s 
(1990) emphasis on self-preservation as a policy goal. 
AN EXAMINATION OF TWO HYPOTHESES 
Political sponsors may benefit from "profits" since 
higher "profits" reduce bUdget deficits. If the political 
costs of financing government spending through "profits" 
are relatively low, politicians may signal incentives to 
the Federal Reserve in such ways as to promote large 
"profits." If the bureaucratic goals of the Federal 
Reserve include self-preservation, autonomy and 
expense-preference behavior, the Federal Reserve may 
appease political sponsors by producing "profits" policy 
that minimizes the odds of adverse changes in its ability 
to consume those bureaucratic goals. Such behavior may 
afford the Federal Reserve the ability to further 
bureaucratic goals as well as those mandated by sponsors 
(budget deficits, macroeconomic stability, etc.) 
Commercial bankers and bond traders may benefit from 
large "profits" since, to the extent that policy involves 
higher open market churning, rising "profits" may raise 
the profitability of bond traders and increase their 
value as Fed-watchers. If "profits" policy leads to lower 
political scrutiny of Federal Reserve performance, such 
pOlicy may also translate into lower scrutiny or 
regulation of financial firms and bond traders. If the 
pUblic is concerned over bUdget deficits, as reflected in 
their influence over the timing of interest rate and 
price level changes, they may also influence the ability 
of the Federal Reserve to meet pOlicy goals relating to 
interest rates and inflation. To the extent that rising 
bUdget deficits affect its ability to meet interest-rate 
and inflation goals, "profits" may be partially 
influenced by the deficit. 17 
Two hypotheses stem from this discussion. The first 
hypothesis is that the federal budget deficit is a 
determinant of the size of Federal Reserve "profits." 
That is, relatively large bUdget deficits are 
hypothesized to be associated with relatively large 
"profits." Hypothesis 1 is related to the reaction 
function literature and specifically the issue of whether 
or not the Federal Reserve monetizes federal budget 
deficits. The issue is whether or not, in the face of 
rising deficits and a goal of interest rate stability, 
the Federal Reserve alters money growth. While Barro 
(1977), Dwyer (1982) and Niskanen (1978) report that 
money growth is not related to deficits, Levy (1981), 
Laney and Willett (1983) and Grier and Neiman (1987) 
report the opposite. Recently, Joines (1990) argues that 
the current length of time series precludes our ability 
to test this issue. This issue bears on hypothesis 1 
since, to the extent that its open market activity is 
responsive to rising deficits, a positive relationship 
between "profits" and bUdget deficits may be guaranteed 
since Federal Reserve revenues are primarily determined 
by open market activity. 
These complications, however, do not necessarily 
suggest an alternative to hypothesis 1 since, in reaction 
to rising deficits, open market operations may react in 
several distinct manners. One manner is to expand its 
open market account, on a net basis, in such a manner as 
to alter money growth and inflation. Another manner is to 
simply increase its gross portfolio churning without 
permanently changing money growth. These two manners need 
not raise "profits" since they may be consistent with 
either capital gains or losses when the Federal Reserve 
is attempting to stabilize interest rates. Another 
possibility is that open market policy remains unchanged 
in the face of rising deficits. Finally, even if rising 
deficits bring higher revenues through the open market 
desk, increased revenues may lead to higher consumption 
of bureaucratic goals (as predicted by "expense­
preference" theory) and therefore not lead to changes in 
"profits." These complexities indicate that the "profit" 
- deficit relationship is an empirical issue and that 
testing of hypothesis 1 is preliminary or suggestive. 
The second hypothesis is that public sector spending 
is influenced by "profits." This hypothesis follows from 
the fiscal illusion notion of Buchanan and Wagner (1977) 
that predicts that government spending will be larger, 
the greater taxes are hidden from taxpayers. In addition, 
the tax-spend hypothesis of Friedman (1978) argues that 
when taxes are raised, spe~ding increases follow. 18 Since 
"profits" may be a well-hidden tax, it is hypothesized 
that higher "profits" cause higher government spending. 
Note that a positive "profits" - spending relationship is 
not necessarily the result of conscious decision-making, 
but rather may simply be a by-product of the incentives, 
constraints and goals facing the Federal Reserve. 
One important counter-hypothesis to the "fiscal 
illusion" hypothesis of government spending is the 
Ricardian Equivalence hypothesis. For example, Barro 
(1977) argues that voters are not myopic about the costs 
of different forms of government finance. Rather, this 
hypothesis assumes that voters appropriately discount the 
many different types of finance (taxes, deficits, loan 
guarantees, etc.) when deciding on how much government to 
vote for. Under this view, voters realize the taxes 
associated with Federal Reserve "profits" and therefore 
the ratio of government spending that is funded by 
"profits" should not influence government spending. 
Moreover, this view predicts that there is no fundamental 
difference between the case where the Federal Reserve 
pays "profits" to the Treasury and the case where it adds 
them to its own surplus. In either case, this view would 
predict that the financial position of th~ U.S. 
government is the same. 
There are various potential problems with this 
counter-view of the influence of Federal Reserve 
"profits" on government spending. One issue is whether or 
not the public actually properly discounts "profits" as 
taxes that ultimately fund government spending, or reduce 
budget def ic its. Another issue is whether or not Congress 
would behave the same whether or not it directly receives 
Federal Reserve "profits" or if those dollars remain as 
Federal Reserve surplus. It is not clear how Congress 
could spend Federal Reserve "profits II when they remain in 
Federal Reserve surplus. However, when "profits II are 
transferred to the Treasury, they may be immediately 
spent, or used to lower the bUdget deficit. 
Moreover, under present institutional arrangements, 
the Federal Reserve is not an lion-budget" government 
agency. While its "profits" (when sent to the Treasury) 
show up on the government's balance sheet under payments, 
or taxes, its spending does not show up on either side of 
the government's balance sheet. Moreover, if the Federal 
Reserve retains "profits" as surplus, changes in either 
side of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet will have no 
effect on the balance sheet of the federal government. 
Therefore, it would appear that the argument that it 
doesn't matter, from a consolidated balance sheet 
approach, whether the Federal Reserve retains "profits" 
as surplus or sends them to the Treasury is not 
particularly useful. In any event, these points remain 
empirical issues and, if the Ricardian Equivalence 
approach is correct, there should be no support for 
Hypothesis 2. 
Figure-l demonstrates the increasing importance of 
"profits" to the overall financing efforts of the federal 
government. As a percentage of federal revenues, 
"profits" have risen from approximately .2 percent to 2 
percent of federal revenues over 1947-89. Figure-2 
eXhibits the contribution that "profits" have made to 
lowering the federal budgot deficit. The "before" deficit 
is measured as the bUdget deficit less "profits" and the 
"after" deficit nets out the contribution from "profits." 
casually, "profits" have grown with federal deficit 
growth and, consistent with Figure-1, the contribution of 
"profits" towards lowering the budget deficit has risen 
during the 1980s. 
Tests of Hypothesis 1 
Testing of hypothesis 1 is performed by regressing 
a time series of "profits" PROFIT on a constant and the 
net federal budget deficit NETDEF, which is equal to the 
federal budget deficit less "profits. ,,19 The deficit 
NETDEF is measured on a net basis since it is 
hypothesized that Federal Reserve policy is based on its 
perception of the size of the budget deficit that would 
prevail without any reduction from "profits." "Profits" 
PROFIT is obtained from Office of Management and Budget 
(1990) and represents Treasury "deposits of earnings from 
the Federal Reserve System." The federal bUdget deficit 
is obtained from council of Economic Advisors (1990) . The 
choice of sample period is based on the fact that the 
"Profits" I Federal Revenues 
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PROFIT series commences in 1947. All data are 
first-differenced because most time series of level data 
contain some time trend. All data are measured in $ 
billions. 
Two alternative specifications are considered: 
nominal and inflation-adjusted. The inflation-adjusted 
specification uses the GNP deflator and controls for the 
common element of inflation premiums in both federal 
deficits and "profits." The following coefficients 
(t-statistics) were estimated over 1948-89 for the 
nominal model: 
PROFIT = 0.38 - 0.02 NETDEF 
(3.16) (3.67) 
R2 = .23 s.e.e. = 0.77 DW = 1.47 F(2,40) = 13.48. 
The statistically significant inverse relationship 
between NETDEF and PROFIT is consistent with the 
hypothesis that, when deficits are relatively high, they 
lead to relatively large "profits." Note, that because 
deficits are represented as negative numbers, larger 
deficits (negative numbers) will interact with the 
negative coefficient to exert a positive effect on 
Ilprofits." The coefficient on NETDEF is statistically 
significant from zero at the .001 level (2-tailed test) . 
Because casual inspections of Figure-1 and Figure-2 
indicate that the size of "profits," relative to the 
budget deficit, is much greater in the recent past, 
several other sample periods are considered in order to 
determine whether or not the estimates are 
time-sensitive. The following periods are considered: 
1965-89 and 1975-89. For 1965-89, the following 
coefficients were estimated: 
PROFIT = 0.62 - 0.02 NETDEF 
(3.31) (2.84) 
R2 = .23 s.e.e. = 0.92 DW = 1.66 F(2,23) = 8.07. 
For 1975-89, the following coefficients were estimated: 
PROFIT =	 0.76 - 0.02 NETDEF 
(2.64) (2.60) 
R2 = .29 s.e.e. = 1.07 DW = 1.43 F(2,13) = 6.78. 
These results suggest that the effect of NETDEF on PROFIT 
is unchanged over the time period. 
The following coefficients (t-statistics) were 
estimated over 1948-89 for the inflation (GNP deflator)­
adjusted model: 
PROFIT = 0.34 - 0.01 NETDEF 
(2.40) (1. 67) 
R2 = .04 s.e.e. = 0.90 OW = 2.09 F(2,40) = 2.79. 
Based on a two-tailed test, the estimated inverse 
relationship between NETDEF and PROFIT is 0.103, or 
slightly below the commonly-used benchmark of .10. As in 
the nominal specification, two other sample periods are 
considered in order to determine whether or not the 
estimates are time-sensitive. For 1965-89, the following 
coefficients were estimated: 
PROFIT = 0.47 - 0.01 NETDEF 
(2.23) (1.36) 
R2 = .03 s.e.e. = 1.05 OW = 1.92 F(2,23) = 1.85. 
For	 1975-89, the following coefficients were estimated: 
PROFIT = 0.32 - 0.02 NETDEF 
(1.14) (2.33) 
R2 = .24 s.e.e. = 1.08 OW = 1.48 F(2,13) = 5.43. 
While the estimations over 1965-89 indicate no 
statistical relationship between NETOEF and PROFIT, the 
estimations over 1975-89 indicate a statistically 
significant and inverse relationship at the .036 level 
(2-tailed test) . That the relationship is only 
statistically significant in the later period may be 
consistent with the casual evidence in Figure-1 that 
indicates that "profits" exert a larger effect on the 
bUdget deficit in the second half of the sample period. 
Consistent with the previously-discussed caveats 
regarding the difficulty of modeling "profits" behavior, 
these results provide some preliminary support for the 
hypothesis that "profits" are influenced by the bUdget 
deficit. 
Tests of Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 tests the following model of government 
size: 
SIZE = f(RATIO, DEC, GRANT, Y, POP) 
where SIZE (federal & nonfederal spending) / GNP 
RATIO = Federal Reserve "profits" / federal 
revenues 
DEC = nonfederal spending/(federal & 
nonfederal spending) 
GRANT = grants / (federal & nonfederal spending) 
Y = per capita real income ($1982) 
POP = population 
A similar model of government size is used in Oates 
(1986) and Marlow (1988).20 RATIO measures the degree to 
which federal revenues are composed of "profits. ,,21 The 
expected sign on RATIO is positive following the argument 
that relatively higher values of RATIO cause greater 
fiscal illusion, and therefore government expenditure as 
well. 
DEC controls for fiscal decentralization and is 
expected to exert an inverse effect on SIZE. The expected 
sign on GRANT is positive following the argument that 
intergovernmental grants are cartel-like devices that 
expand monopoly power of government. Population POP 
controls for demand changes and per capita real income Y 
controls for Wagner's Law, or that government 
expenditures are income-elastic. All data are log 
first-differenced and therefore represent growth rates 
and, in response to data constraints, the estimations are 
conducted over 1948-89. The regression coefficients 
(2-tailed t-statistics) for the SIZE equation are given 
below. 
SIZE = 0.02 0.72 DEC + 0.11 GRANT - 0.88 Y 
(1. 06) (6.76) (1.69) (3.48) 
+ 0.98 POP + 0.05 RATIO 
(0.86) (4.59) 
R2= • 72 s . e . e. . 028 DW = 1. 80 F(6 , 36) = 21. 7 1 
As hypothesized, RATIO exerts the hypothesized 
positive effect and one that it is highly statistically 
significant (.001 level). The coefficient on DEC is 
statistically significant (.0001 level) and exerts the 
hypothesized inverse effect on government size. 
Population growth is not found to exert a statistically 
significant effect on SIZE. Per capita income growth 
exerts a negative and statistically significant effect 
(.027 level) on SIZE; a result that suggests that 
government is an inferior good. The coefficient on GRANTS 
exhibits the hypothesized sign and is weakly 
statistically significant (.099 level). 
In order to determine if the above results are 
sensitive to time, estimations are conducted over two 
subsamples. In order to correct for serial correlation 
over this time period, a first-order autoregressive term 
SIZE(-l) is added to the equation. The following 
coefficients are estimated over 1965-89: 
SIZE == 0.02 1.29 DEC + 0.07 GRANT - 0.39 Y 
(1.11) (4.33) (1.22) (1.48) 
+ 3.68 POP + 0.10 RATIO + 0.75 SIZE(-l) 
(2.61) (3.80) (3.93) 
s.e.e. .020 DW= 1.74 F(7,18) = 8.50 
RATIO continues to exert a statistically significant 
positive effect (.001 level) on SIZE. The coefficient on 
DEC remains statistically significant and negative. 
Population growth is now found to exert a positive and 
statistically significant (.02 level) influence on SIZE. 
Per capita income growth no longer exerts a statistically 
significant effect on SIZE and the coefficient on GRANTS 
no longer exhibits statistical significance. 
The following coefficients are estimated over 1975­
89: 
SIZE = 0.02 0.76 DEC + 0.23 GRANT - 1.2~ Y 
(0.51) (1.26) (1.25) (1.56) 
+ 0.55 POP + 0.11 RATIO + 0.66 SIZE(-l)(0.20) (2.34) (1.73) 
s.e.e. .020 DW 1. 67 F(7,18) = 21. 71 
RATIO continues to exhibit the hypothesized positive 
effect though it is now of lower statistical 
significance (.047 level, 2-tailed). The coefficient on 
DEC is no longer statistically significant which suggest 
that its influence on SIZE varies over 1948-89. 
PopUlation growth is not found to exert a statistically 
significant effect on SIZE - a result consistent with the 
total time span of 1948-89, but not with the estimation 
over ~965-89. Per capita income growth does not influence 
SIZE which is consistent with the estimations over 1965­
89, but inconsistent with the 1948-89 time period. GRANTS 
is not found to influence SIZE - a result consistent with 
the ~965-89 estimation which found no relation and the 
~948-89 estimation which found a very weak influence. It 
is noted that estimation over such a short period (~5 
observations) may involve serious degrees-of-freedom 
problems which may severely limit the usefulness of this 
estimation. 
In sum, the results tend to support hypothesis 2. 
Estimations over 1948-89 and two sUbsamples indicate that 
government spending is influenced by Federal Reserve 
"profits. ,,22 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this paper suggest that the political 
dependence of the Federal Reserve is an important 
ingredient in our understanding of its policy. This view 
does not predict that macroeconomic goals like price or 
interest rate stability are absent from the Federal 
Reserve's goal function; only that these goals do not 
necessarily dominate policy. The constraints facing the 
bureau are a determining factor of the degree to which 
each goal is promoted and, in order for the Federal 
Reserve to place emphasis on efforts aimed at stabilizing 
the economy, it must operate under constraints that 
promote that end. Other goals, such as bureaucratic or 
the resolving of political problems related to budget 
deficits may also be pursued and therefore affect pOlicy 
behavior. 
The evidence reported here suggests some support for 
the hypothesis that the Federal Reserve I s "prof its" 
policy reflects a desire to reduce federal budget 
deficits. This hypothesis views such behavior as optimal 
on the part of the Federal Reserve, given the constraints 
imposed on the Federal Reserve by congress, the 
President, the banking community and the public. 
"Profits" policy also appears to exert an independent 
influence on government spending. 
One implication is that the Federal Reserve is 
responsible, to some degree, for changes in the budget 
deficit. Because Congress set up the Federal Reserve with 
the ability to raise taxes through "profits", its 
activities can affect the size of the deficit through its 
covert role in fiscal policy. Further research on the 
extent to which open market churning is related to the 
Federal Reserve I s concern for the bUdget def icit may 
contribute to our understanding of the much-studied 
randomness in money growth. That is, to what extent do 
the many constraints on Federal Reserve policy contribute 
to the randomness of money growth? 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. It may also be argued that the Federal Reserve is 
sUbject to its own internal constraint, or "code of 
conduct. " 
2. See Toma (1982) and Congressional Budget Office (1985) 
for greater detail on the financial constraints imposed 
on the Federal Reserve. 
3. Figure obtained from Office of Management and BUdget 
(1990) . 
4. See the December 1989 issue of Federal Reserve 
Bulletin. 
5. Buchanan and Wagner (1977, p.119) also argue that, 
because the effects of its pOlicy actions are uncertain, 
it will be relatively difficult for the Federal Reserve 
to resist external pressures on their policies. 
Relatively high uncertainty of policy outcomes is 
consistent with Meltzer's (1987, p.ll) argument that our 
predictive abilities are so unreliable that it is 
generally impossible to "distinguish consistently between 
a boom and a recession either in the current quarter or 
a year in advance." 
6. See Toma (1982) and Congressional BUdget Office (1985) 
for discussions of these changes. 
7. Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argue that growing 
government centralization adversely affects government 
performance. See Marlow (1988) and Joulfaian and Marlow 
(1990) which test the hypothesis that greater 
centralization allows governments to act more like 
monopolists in their taxation and spending decisions. 
8. Data reported in Shughart and Tollison (1983) also 
indicates growing employment centralization of the 
Federal Reserve. That is, the ratio of Board 
employees-to-total employees of the Federal Reserve 
system exhibits a positive trend and reflects a greater 
power base in Washington, D.C. 
9. Haslag and Hein (1989) dispute the argument that the 
MCA has raised average reserve requirements of all 
financial institutions. 
10. After controlling for growth in various activities 
(like check clearing), empirical evidence supports the 
hypothesis that bureaucratic incentives (employment) 
drive the money supply process and contradict the 
conventional view that increases in money result in more 
employees for the purpose of handling larger numbers of 
duties. Note, however, that Banaian et al (1988) argue 
that, under the current institutional structure with the 
100% tax, there is no behavioral reason to need to 
increase revenues in order to increase expenses. 
11. As partial support of this hypothesis, the authors 
cite a 1979 Business Week article Which reports that 
Chairman Arthur Burns instigated this policy. 
12. Rolnick (1985) argues tha~ their empirical work is 
suspect. 
13. See Federal Reserve Board (1984) for these duties. 
14. Rather than wishing to promote banking safety t 
Shughart argues that the Act promoted three other 
interests: 1. brokerage firms eliminated competition from 
banks in the investment banking marketj 2. bankers 
eliminated competition from securities dealers in the 
market for depos it taking j and 3. the U. S . Treasury 
benefitted from the expansion of the market for its 
securities. 
15. Assuming that policy was based on the wishes of 
congressmen serving on oversight committees ( the agents 
of member banks in their states), they examined bank 
failure rates across states and concluded that nonmember 
failure rates were significantly higher in states with 
representation on the House Banking and Currency 
Committee. 
1.6. Marlow (1990) argues that policy predictability 
affects the degree to which the Federal Reserve can 
control real GNP and inflation. 
1.7. An unresolved issue is how important a component of 
"profits" is churning. For example, does it have more of 
an effect on the timing of profits than on their total 
magnitUde? 
1.8. See Manage and Marlow (1986) and Marlow and 
Orzechowski (1988) for theory and empirical evidence on 
this hypothesis. Crain and Marlow (1990) provide evidence 
that another "hidden" tax, Social Security contributions, 
affects government spending in a similar manner. 
1.9. While there exists, as discussed in Grier and Neiman 
(1987), the issue of whether or not to cyclically adjust 
budget deficits, this is not considered here. 
20. SIZE measures the expenditure-based size of 
government and follows the Marlow (1988) argument that, 
when governments run persistent bUdget deficits, 
expenditure-based measures provide a better measure of 
government I s resource absorption than those based on 
revenues. Expenditure-based, or revenue-based, measures 
of government size still fail to capture many other 
government activities such as laws, regulations and 
off-budget spending (see Marlow and Joulfaian 1989). All 
units of government are measured in SIZE based on the 
Joulfaian and Marlow (1990) argument that empirical work 
is misspecified When all competing governments are not 
included in measures of government size. The estimated 
relationship between RATIO and SIZE is not affected by 
this issue; i.e., when SIZE is measured without, 
nonfederal spending, the estimated relationship did not 
change. 
21. An alternative measure of RATIO, "profits"/ (federal 
+ nonfederal revenues), did not alter the estimated 
relationship. 
22. It is also noted that there may be a causality 
problem here that may warrant further research in this 
area. If, holding taxes constant, an increase in 
government size generates higher monetary expansion (and 
hence higher "profits"), a larger RATIO may result. 
Further research of this issue may wish to examine some 
forms of causality tests. 
